TENDER OFFERS IN THE BROADCAST
INDUSTRY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although many view mass media as an important means of conveying a diversity of opinions, ideas, and information to the public,' former
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Mark Fowler
rejected the notion that broadcasting is a unique industry. He characterized the television as "just another appliance, . . . a toaster with pictures."'2 Fowler thus advocated unrestricted operation of the free market
in the broadcast industry. 3 In 1985, the broadcast industry experienced
unprecedented merger and acquisition activity. 4 In contrast to transfers
of control in unregulated businesses, all transfers of control involving
broadcast licenses must be examined and approved by the FCC. The
Commission feared that its traditional approval procedures-which
strictly control corporate broadcast licensees-would inhibit the free
market.
The Communications Act of 1934,5 designed to control the "allocation and regulation of the use of radio frequencies by prohibiting such
use except under license,"' 6 gives the FCC the responsibility of granting
applications for broadcast licenses on the basis of whether the grant will
serve "the public interest, convenience and necessity."' 7 The public interest standard is not an unlimited directive to further the general public
welfare. Rather, the purposes behind the Communications Act reveal
that the public's interest with respect to broadcasting lies in receiving
8
high-quality service from a qualified licensee.
1. See, e.g., Compaigne, The ExpandingBase of Media Competition, J. COMM., Summer 1985,
at 81.
2. Mayer, FCC Chief's Fears: FowlerSees Threat in Regulation, Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1983, at
K6, col. 1.
3. See Fowler & Brenner, A MarketplaceApproach to BroadcastRegulation, 60 TEX. L. REV.
207 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Heightened Prospectsfor Radio-TV Acquisitions, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
Spring 1985, at 47; Sherman, Are Media Mergers Smart Business?, FORTUNE, June 24, 1985, at 98;
Merger Mania Mounts, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 15, 1985, at 1; The New Bonanza in Broadcasting,
BROADCASTING, Apr. 15, 1985, at 43; Hall, Media Madness, FINANCIAL WORLD, April 17-30,
1985, at 12.
5. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-613 (1988)).
6. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
7. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
8. One Two Corp., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924, 941 (1985) (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting).
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The Communications Act imposes procedural requirements on the
application review process in order to ensure that FCC licensing decisions are based on appropriate public interest determinations. These requirements include allowing for public comment and submission of
petitions to deny the application. In the event of such petitions, the applicant is permitted to reply. Depending upon whether a substantial
question of material fact as to the applicant's qualifications is raised, the
FCC may schedule a hearing. Only after this process can the Commission decide whether granting the application will serve the public interest. This procedure generally applies to those seeking a broadcast
license, as well as those, such as tender offerors, seeking to gain control of
a licensee. Therefore, before a tender offer of a broadcast company can
be consummated, the tender offeror must apply to the FCC, the public
must be allowed time to submit comments and petitions to deny the application, and ultimately the Commission must determine that a transfer
of control to the applicant is in the public interest.
Section 309(f), the focus of this Note, provides an exception to this
procedural scheme. That provision authorizes the Commission to grant
special temporary operating authority (STA), which bypasses the traditional review procedures including the public comment period, "if [the
Commission] finds that there are extraordinary circumstances requiring
temporary operations in the public interest and that delay in the institution of such temporary operations would seriously prejudice the public
interest." 9 This Note addresses the Commission's use of that exception
in the context of tender offers involving broadcast licenses.
The Commission detailed the apparent inadequacies of the traditional approval procedures in its Notice of Inquiry on Tender Offers and
Proxy Contests. 10 The inquiry solicited comments concerning appropriate agency procedures to be used in connection with tender offerg. The
Commission sought a new procedure that would achieve four objectives.
The first objective, a procedural one, was compliance with the requirements of the Communications Act. The other three objectives were policy goals designed to promote government neutrality, avoid unnecessary
delays, and accommodate other laws concerning the governance of
corporations.
Although the FCC labelled compliance with the procedural requirements of the Communications Act an objective, such compliance is not a
discretionary option-it is a mandate. Only if the new procedure advocated by the Commission complies with the Act is it legal. And even if
9. 47 U.S.C. § 309(f) (1988).
10. Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, Notice of Inquiry, MM Docket No. 85-218, FCC 83-349
(adopted July 9, 1985; released August 20, 1985).
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the new procedure satisfies this obstacle, it must still comply with the
Act's policy mandate of furthering the public interest.

This Note examines the Commission's determination, set forth in its
Policy Statement on Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, I"that tender of-

fers warrant treatment under section 309(f) and concludes that this utilization of section 309(f) violates the procedural and policy mandates of
the Communications Act. After discussing the procedure adopted by the

Commission,' 2 the Note, through an analysis of the language of the
Communications Act, 13 its legislative history, 14 and the Commission's

applications, 5t demonstrates that the Commission exceeded its authority
by adopting such a procedure. Finally, the Note examines the policies

that the Commission sought to serve through the new procedure and
concludes that not only are the premises upon which the goals are based

misleading, but also that the goals themselves are incompatible with the
policy objective underlying the Communications Act of serving the pub16
lic interest.

II.

PROCEDURAL MANDATES

The primary responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission is to execute and enforce the provisions of the Communications
Act.17 Those provisions prohibit the unlicensed use of the airwaves' 8 and
empower the FCC to grant applications for new broadcast licenses, for

modification or renewal of broadcast licenses, and for transfers of licenses
or companies holding broadcast licenses. '9 Therefore, before consummation of a tender offer involving a company holding an FCC license, the

offeror must secure Commission approval. Such approval depends upon
11. Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536 (1986) [hereinafter Policy
Statement].
12. See infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 64-92 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
18. Id. § 301.
19. Section 308 gives the Commission the authority to grant "station licenses, or modifications
or renewals thereof." Id. § 308(a). Pursuant to section 310(d), the Commission is authorized to
grant applications for transfers of control of broadcast licenses. In each situation, the same procedures govern:
No ... station license, or any rights thereunder, shall be transferred, assigned, or disposed
of in any manner, voluntarily or involuntarily, directly or indirectly, or by transfer of control of any corporation holding such.., license, to any person except upon application to
the Commission .... Any such application shall be disposed of as if the proposed transferee or assignee were making application under section 308 of this title for the ... license
in question ....
Id. § 310(d).
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a determination by the Commission that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting" 20 of the license

application.
A.

The Statute's Application Approval Requirements

Approval by the FCC traditionally involves the following procedural requirements. The applicant seeking consent to a transfer of con-

trol must file a long form application. 21 After public notice of the license
application, section 309(b) of the Act imposes a thirty-day waiting period
for public comment. 22 This waiting period is meant to ensure that the

public has an opportunity to participate in the Commission's public interest determination. Petitions to deny the application may be filed, in
which case an applicant is given additional time to file a reply. 23 If the
Commission determines that a substantial and material question of fact

exists as to whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be
served by granting the application, the Commission will designate the
24
application for hearing.
Section 309(f) of the Communications Act authorizes the Commission to bypass the traditional procedures for granting license applica-

tions. The Commission may grant a special temporary authority (STA)
to broadcast immediately "if it finds that there are extraordinary circumstances requiring temporary operations in the public interest and that
20. Section 309(a) provides:
[Tihe Commission shall determine, in the case of each application filed with it to which
section 308 of this title applies, whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will
be served by the granting of such application, and, if the Commission ....upon consideration of such other matters as the Commission may officially notice, shall find that public
interest, convenience, and necessity would be served by the granting thereof, it shall grant
such application.
Id. § 309(a).
21. Pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540(d) (1989) applications for consent to transfer of control of
corporations holding broadcast licenses must be filed on FCC Form 315-a long form applicationor FCC Form 316, a short form application. "Generally, a short form application ... is used in
situations described in Section 309(c)(2)(B) of the Act, including those that do not involve a substantial change in ownership or control. In other situations, the long form application.., is normally
used." One Two Corp., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924, 925 n.1 (1985) (citations omitted).
22. "Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, no such application . . . shall be
granted by the Commission earlier than thirty days following issuance of public notice by the Commission of the acceptance for filing of such application or of any substantial amendment thereof." 47
U.S.C. § 309(b) (1988).
23. "Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny any application...
to which subsection (b) of this section applies at any time prior to the day of Commission grant ....
The applicant shall be given the opportunity to file a reply ...." Id. § 309(d)(1).
24. "If, in the case of any application to which subsection (a) of this section applies, a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the Commission for any reason is unable to make
the finding specified in such subsection, it shall formally designate the application for hearing ...
Id. § 309(e).
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delay in the institution of such temporary operations would seriously
prejudice the public interest. '2 5 That temporary grant is limited to 180
days, with the possibility of an unlimited number of 180-day
26
extensions.
B.

The Commission's Bifurcated Procedure

In 1985 the Commission, relying on section 309(f), began employing a bifurcated procedure for the approval of tender offers involving
FCC licenses. 27 This approach utilizes an interim voting trust as a supplement to the traditional license application and was adopted in the
Commission's Policy Statement. Under this two-step procedure, the offeror simultaneously submits a traditional long form application, a short
form application, 2 8 and a trust agreement. On an expedited basis, without awaiting section 309(b)'s 30-day petition to deny period, the Commission reviews only the short-form application and the trust agreement.
In the trust agreement, the tender offeror submits an independent trustee.
The Commission will assess the qualifications of the tender offeror's chosen trustee to determine whether he should be permitted to collect and
vote the shares of stock tendered in response to the offeror's bid and to
operate the licensed facility, if enough shares are collected. 29 If the
short-form application is approved, the Commission grants a section
309(f) STA to the trustee. Subject to certain conditions, the trustee can
exercise the rights of operation, collection, and voting. These conditions
include, for example, the requirement of strict separation between the
trustee and the offeror to ensure that the trustee will be able to act independently. 30 If the tender offer is successful, the second step entails consideration of the long form application of the tender offeror for transfer
25. Id. § 309(f).
26. Id.
27. The first decision in which the FCC approved the two-step procedure for tender offers, One
Two Corp., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924 (1985), was released on July 19, 1985. The Commission
had endorsed the procedure in Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, Notice of Inquiry, supra note 10,
which was adopted on July 9, 1985, but not released until August 20, 1985.
28. See supra note 21 for discussion of long-form and short-form applications. The use of
short-form applications in the Policy Statement's bifurcated procedure is based solely on section
309(f), not on a finding that tender offers constitute insubstantial changes in control. See Policy
Statement, supra note 11, at 1569 n. 147.
29. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1562-63.
30. Id. at 1579 ("The best method of safeguarding the independence of the trustee is to require
strict separation between the trustee and the offeror."). Although significant restrictions are imposed on the trustee, he or she also retains substantial authority. "The trustee will be permitted, for
example, to participate in the election of the Board of Directors. The trustee may elect to serve as a
director personally and may fully vote the tendered stock in corporate elections of the Board." Id. at
1582 (footnote omitted).

Vol. 1991:240]

BROADCAST TENDER OFFERS

of control from the trustee. 31 The second step includes review of any
petitions to deny, replies, or hearings that would otherwise accompany
license grants under section 309(b).
The Commission asserts that its reliance on section 309(f) in departing from the procedures required by section 309(b) complies with the
mandates of the Communications Act. 32 The Policy Statement emphasizes that the Commission has the discretion to consider the grant of
STA's with respect to all categories of applications, including situations
that involve ownership changes. 33 As the Agency noted, "[t]he purpose
of [the provision] was to enable the Commission to avoid the statute's 30day waiting period in appropriate circumstances, [and there is no basis]
for believing this purpose does not apply to the 30-day period for transfer
applications. ' 34 After establishing the appropriateness of section
309(f)'s application in the tender offer context, the Commission determined that tender offers categorically satisfy the provision's
requirements.
The fundamental requirement of section 309(f) is that "extraordinary circumstances" exist before the departure from traditional license
approval procedures is justified. According to the Commission, hostile
tender offers themselves are "extraordinary circumstances" within the
meaning of the statute. 35 The Policy Statement offers three justifications
in support of this conclusion. First, the Commission noted that tender
offers may be subject not only to the procedural requirements of the
Communications Act and the rules of the Commission, but also to the
Williams Act, 3 6 SEC rules implementing that Act, and state regulations.
The Commission concluded that the potential for conflicts among regulatory schemes presents an extraordinary circumstance meriting section
309(f) special procedures. 37 One potential conflict results from the Williams Act's provision for withdrawal of tendered shares by the shareholders if a tender offer is not consummated within sixty days. 3 8 In the
broadcast industry, this provision can work hardship on tender offerors
31. Id. at 1563-64.
32. "We find [that the] ... criteria [of section 309(f)] are met in the exceptional situation in
which a tender offer is used as a means to obtain control of a communications corporation." Id. at
1570.
33. Id. at 1573.
34. Id. at 1573 n.165 (quoting L.P. Media, Inc., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1527, 1530 (1985)).
35. Id. at 1570 ("[I]t is the circumstances presented by the tender offer itself that are extraordinary" (quoting LP. Media, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 1532)).
36. The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)), added sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(f) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
37. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1569.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988); see infra text accompanying notes 145-148.
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who would consummate their offers within sixty days but for the waiting
periods incorporated into traditional Commission approval. Thus, the
combination of the Williams Act and the Communications Act may restrict the ability of tender offerors to provide to shareholders the financial
opportunities normally available in the marketplace. 39 Without the use
of expedited procedures, the Commission sees its regulatory processes as
effectively precluding the use of tender offers to obtain control over communications companies.
Not only do tender offerors in the broadcast field face potentially
conflicting regulatory schemes, but those schemes also are aimed at the
achievement of varying policy goals. The second rationale offered in the
Policy Statement to demonstrate that tender offers involving broadcast
companies constitute "extraordinary circumstances" is the compelling
need to accommodate the public policies embodied in security laws on
tender offers. 4° The main policy objective of the Williams Act, for instance, is shareholder protection. As a necessary incident of that objective, the Williams Act encourages strict neutrality on the part of the
SEC.4 1 The FCC sees the delays inherent in the use of long-form procedures for tender offer applications as biased toward incumbent manage42
ment, and thus as inconsistent with the goal of neutrality.
Finally, the extraordinary circumstances that communications industry tender offers present include the potential use of administrative
43
procedures as a shield by incumbent management.
Having determined that tender offers involving broadcast licensees
are "extraordinary," the Commission asserts that the temporary "operations" authorized by section 309(f) do not refer simply to temporarily
permitting the broadcasting of signals when traditional application procedures would result in a threat to signal transmission. Instead, the
Commission argues that the term "operations" refers to temporarily
changing ownership of a licensee where no threat to signal transmission
is present. In the FCC's view, transferring control of a licensed company
44
to a trustee constitutes "temporary operations."
39. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1570.
40. Id. at 1571.
41. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (achieving government neutrality was not
the objective of the Act, but is a necessary characteristic of legislation with the purpose of protecting
shareholder interests).
42. For discussion of FCC's argument that delays inherent in the long form procedures unduly
favor management, see infra notes 143-149 and accompanying text.
43. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1571. For discussion of the potential for incumbent
management to use the traditional procedures as a shield, see infra notes 148-149 and accompanying
text. This argument is really a subset of the FCC's argument that long form review procedures
unduly favor management.
44. Id. at 1571-72.
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The legality of this bifurcated procedure approved by the Commis-

sion in the Policy Statement has not been judicially determined.4 5 Skepticism exists within the Commission itself,46 on the bench, 47 and among

legal scholars 48 as to whether the Commission has accurately interpreted
section 309(f).
C.

Statutory Construction
When a federal court rules on the merits of a challenge to the legal-

ity of the procedures adopted in the Policy Statement, it will not be
bound by the Commission's construction of the Communications Act.
As the Supreme Court explained, "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on
the issue of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent." 49 Using the
"traditional tools of statutory construction, ' 50 the court. reviewing the
FCC's bifurcated procedure must examine congressional intent regarding

the application of section 309(f)'s special temporary authority. In analyzing congressional intent, the court is "not required to grant any particular deference to the agency's parsing of statutory language or its
interpretation of legislative history. '51 Only if the court determines that
the intent of Congress as to when STA's may be granted is unclear from
the language and legislative history of the Act, will the court proceed to
determine whether the agency's interpretation is valid as based on "a

permissible construction of the statute. '5 2 The Court reaches this second
step of determining whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable
45. Review of Policy Statement was sought in Office of Communication of United Church of
Christ v. F.C.C., 826 F.2d 101, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987). However, the majority dismissed the suit as
not sufficiently ripe for judicial consideration.
46. Commissioner Quello dissented from Policy Statement, stating that he "reject[s] the idea
that employing a trustee arrangement in the hostile takeover context can substitute for full examination of the applicant's qualifications before a substantial change in ownership or control of a licensee
can be approved." Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1584 (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting).
47. See, eg., United Church, 826 F.2d at 113 n.6 (Wald, J., dissenting) ("Were the panel to
reach the merits, I would hold that the FCC's new policy with respect to tender offerors goes beyond
its statutory power under § 309(f).").
48. See, eg., McGill, The Market For CorporateControl in the BroadcastingIndustry, 40 FED.
COMM. L.J. 39, 75 (1988) ("conditional approval represented by the STA may strain the Commission's statutory directive").
49. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); see Note, Redefining "Common Cartier" The FCC'sAttempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501, 514-19
(discussing judicial review of the FCC's interpretation of the Communications Act in compliance
with the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron).
50. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)
(discussing use of legislative history in determining congressional intent).
51. Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Department of Transp., 791 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (quoting Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
52. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
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only if it finds that the first step is not satisfied, that is, only if Congress
was not clear. The second step is not necessary in this case because an
analysis of the language of the Communications Act and its legislative
history unequivocally demonstrate that Congress did not intend for the
special procedures of section 309(f) to apply categorically to tender
offers.
1. Language of the Statute. The original source that courts must
consult when determining congressional intent is the language of the statute.5 3 STA's are available to all qualifying applicants, whether they seek
new broadcast licenses, renewals or modifications of existing licenses, or
transfers of ownership or control of broadcast licensees.5 4 No question
exists about the Act's meaning on that point.55 The real debate surrounds not the scope of the provision's applicability, but rather the requirements that must be satisfied for an STA to be granted.
The Communications Act does not define the terms "extraordinary
circumstances" or "operations. ' 56 The plain meaning of the language,
however, is ordinarily regarded as conclusive in the absence of "a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary. '57 The language of section 309(f) reveals that the requisite "extraordinary" conditions will be
met only where temporary authorization is necessary to "institute" immediate broadcast "operations" or to prevent their discontinuance.5 8
Contrary to the Commission's assertion that change of ownership of a
licensee constitutes operations, the focus of the provision is on station
operations-the transmitting of broadcast signals-and not on the identity of the operator. Granting an STA pursuant to the procedure
adopted in the Policy Statement only affects the identity of who controls
the operations, not whether the operations themselves will continue.
53. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981) ("The starting point in every case involving
statutory construction of a statute is the language itself." (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring))); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) ("We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.").
54. All applicants subject to section 309(b) are eligible for a 309(f) STA. 47 U.S.C. § 309(f)
(1988). Section 309(b) sets forth the general application procedure for applications "to which section 308... applies." Id. § 309(a). According to section 310(d), applications for transfers of control
are to "be disposed of as if the proposed transferee ... were making application under section 308
. . ." Id § 3 10(d). Applications for transfers of control, therefore, are eligible for grants of STA's
under section 309(f).
55. For a discussion of the FCC's emphasis on its discretion to grant STA's with respect to all
categories of applicants, see supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
56. See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1988).
57. Consumer, 447 U.S. at 108.
58. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(f) (1988).
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Operations that are ongoing and not faced with the possibility of

interruption, as in the case of the typical tender offer, are not in need of
special temporary authorization to assure the "institution of operations."
Admittedly, a tender offer can arise under circumstances that, irrespective of the offer, satisfy the requirements of section 309(f). 59 The Commission, however, based its approval of granting STA's in the tender
offer context on the characteristics of broadcast industry tender offers
themselves.

Finally, the Commission's assertion in the Policy Statement that all
tender offers categorically meet the requirements of section 309(f) 60 is

contrary to the language of the provision. This provision specifically
calls for findings by the Commission and a statement of reasons why a
temporary authority is necessary in each case in which an STA is
granted.6 1 Plainly, this extraordinary procedure was not intended to be
the routine practice for dealing with tender offers. This conclusion is

supported by section 310(d), which specifically addresses applications for
involuntary transfers of control of corporations holding station licenses.
In that section, Congress did not instruct the Commission to employ the
special procedures of section 309(f) when dealing with hostile tender offers, but instead directed the Commission to conduct the standard review

of the transfer application just as if the proposed transferee were making
62
application for the license in question.

An evaluation of the plain meaning of section 309(f) suggests that it
should not apply categorically to tender offers. Because the Communications Act supplies no express definitions for the key terms in section
309(f), however, a reviewing court likely will undertake further statutory

analysis to ensure that this plain meaning interpretation was the clear

59. For example, if the tower of a community's only radio broadcaster was destroyed, the company holding the license to broadcast from that tower could apply for an STA to broadcast at variance from its license from a distant tower. The Commission could grant the STA in full compliance
with the Communications Act because extraordinary circumstances-the potential absence of any
available programming in the community-required temporarily transmitting the broadcast signal
from a different tower. If the company holding the license could not afford to move temporarily to
the distant tower, but a tender offeror sought to take control of the company and to relocate broadcasting for a short time, the Commission could again grant the STA in full compliance with the Act
because the requirements of section 309(f) were satisfied irrespective of the offer. See also Gale
Broadcasting Co., 15 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 337 (1969).
60. The Commission stated that,"Section 309(f) empowers us to grant an STA to a trustee in
all situations involving a tender offer of a communications company." Policy Statement, supra note
11, at 1569 n.147 (emphasis added).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (f) (1988).
62. See supra note 19.
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intention of the Congress. Further statutory analysis entails an examina63
tion of the Communication Act's legislative history.
2. Legislative History. Neither section 309(f) as originally enacted nor as amended was intended to apply categorically to tender
offers.
a. Post-grantprotestprocedures. Congress enacted section 309(f)
of the Cdmmunications Act in 1960 as part of a drastic restructuring of
the FCC's licensing procedures." Prior to the 1960 amendments, public
objections to a license application were considered by the Commission
only after the Commission had reviewed and granted the application. 65
If, as a result of such protests, the Commission deemed an evidentiary
hearing necessary, the FCC was authorized to allow the licensee to continue interim operations of its facility upon a finding that "the public
'66
interest requires that the grant remain in effect."
b. Pre-grantprotest procedures. Premised on the congressional
conclusion that "it is more satisfactory that substantial objections to an
application be considered before rather than after a grant," 67 the new
pre-grant protest procedures of section 309(b) 68 were meant to ensure
protesting parties that their objections would be given "timely and adequate consideration. ' 69 In the event that a substantial and material question of fact is presented and not resolved, the statute makes it "absolutely
clear that the application will be designated for hearing before" being
granted.70 Section 309(f) represents an exception to this general policy
of denying the use of the airwaves by those whose public interest qualifications have not been established.
63. See Washington Hosp. Center v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("inquiry into
congressional intent encompasses both statutory language and legislative history"); Donovan v. Rose
Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1985) (if congressional intent is not plainly indicated by
statutory language court should turn to legislative history). There are disputes over the degree to
which the court should emphasize legislative history. See Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in
Statutory and ConstitutionalInterpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE L.J. 160, 16165.
64. Communications Act Amendments of 1960, Pub L. No. 86-752, 74 Stat. 889 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1988)).
65. Communications Act Amendments of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-554, § 309(b), 66 Stat. 711
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1988)); see Folkways Broadcasting Co., v. F.C.C., 379 F.2d 447, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (describing post-grant protest procedures).
66. Act of Jan. 20, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-391, § 309(c), 70 Stat. 3.
67. S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
68. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
69. S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
70. H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960) (emphasis added).
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c. The 1960 version of section 309(f). Section 309(f), as enacted
in 1960, gave the Commission the authority to grant temporary operating authorization, accompanied by a statement of its reasons, "if it finds
that there are extraordinary circumstances requiring emergency operations in the public interest and that delay in the institution of such emergency operations would seriously prejudice the public interest."'7 1 The
grant of emergency operations was limited to ninety days, with the possibility of one additional ninety day period upon certain findings by the
Commission. 72 Although the legislation did not supply examples of situations that satisfied the provision's requirements, Congress did offer examples of situations that would fail only the section's "emergency"
requirement. Situations not properly qualifying as emergencies included
"requests for service to a broadcaster for remote pick-ups of special
events, inauguration of network service to a new broadcast station or requests for the establishment of service to new and temporary headquar73
ters of the President."
The situations above were inappropriate for STA grants solely due
to the lack of urgency, not because they failed to constitute "operations."
Thus, contrary to the FCC's assertion in the Policy Statement, the reference to "operations" in the statute was intended to refer to the necessity
of having broadcast signals transmitted-the need for "service"-not to
the necessity of having a certain operator control the transmission of
those signals. Tender offers generally affect only the choice of who operates a broadcast facility, not whether or not it functions.
Congress' belief that section 309(f) would rarely be invoked reveals
that the provision was intended to be a narrow exception. The provision
was to serve as a "safety valve to protect the public interest in those rare
cases in which the Commission finds that the delay required by [the pregrant protest procedures] would seriously prejudice the public interest." 74 The intended limited use of section 309(f) is exemplified by the
process by which it was introduced into the bill.
The Federal Communications Bar Association ("FCBA"), which
requested the introduction of the original bill modifying the existing
post-grant public protest procedures, 75 did not include a provision for
temporary authorizations in its request. Instead, the FCC brought up
the possibility that extraordinary circumstances might require emergency
71. Communications Act Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, § 309(f), 74 Stat. 889, 891.
72. Id.
73. S.REP.No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 4; accord H.R. REP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1960).
75. S. REP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959).
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operations. 76 Section 309(f) represents a compromise between the two
groups. 77 Letters to Congress regarding the compromise proposal from
FCC Chairman John Doerfer and FCBA President Leonard Marks both
emphasize the narrowness of the statutory exception and the anticipated
infrequency of its use. Chairman Doerfer described the provisions as applying only in "unusual circumstances," adding that "[iun view of the
findings necessary for invoking this section, it is anticipated that it will be
rarely used."' 73 Mr. Marks described the provision as giving the Commission the power to issue temporary authorizations not subject to the
pre-grant procedure "in real and unusual emergencies," adding that the
Commission's representations and the language of the provision "make
clear [its] very limited application. ' 79
Significantly, the FCBA explicitly expressed concern that a temporary authorization provision might be used as a "device for short-circuiting regular procedures." 8 0 In fact, the Association conditioned its
support for the amendments upon the understanding that section 309(f)
would not be used to grant authority merely because the proposed service
was desirable or needed and would be delayed due to pre-grant protest
procedures.81 Based on representations by the FCC, Marks explained to
Congress, "the [FCC] intends to use the authority granted only in the
most unusual and true emergency situations where there are compelling
reasons requiring the conclusion that delay in Commission action itself
will work an extraordinary hardship which would seriously prejudice the
public interest."' 82 It is thus obvious not only that Congress did not in76. See Conditional Grants, Pre-grant Procedure, Local Notice, Local Hearings, Payoffs, Suspension of Licenses, and Deceptive Practices in Broadcasting: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1960) (statement of Ernest
Jennes, American Bar Association) [hereinafter Jennes Statement].
77. Letter from John C. Doerfer to Hon. John 0. Pastore (July 22, 1959), reprinted in S. RaP.
No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959) (section 309(d) in proposal was renumbered section 309(f) in
Act) [hereinafter Doerfer Letter].
78. Id. at 6.
79. Letter from Leonard H. Marks to Hon. John 0. Pastore (July 22, 1959), reprinted in S.
RaP. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959) [hereinafter Marks Letter]; see also Jennes Statement,
supra note 76, at 135 (even though the Association was concerned that the pre-grant protest procedures might be circumvented by section 309(f), it endorsed the provision since "the [FCC] had to
find that there are extraordinary circumstances requiring emergency operations in the public interest, a finding not too easy to make"). (emphasis added).
80. Marks Letter, supra note 79, at 9.
81. The association has agreed to the provision only because it is satisfied that the letter
and spirit of the language in which it is framed will preclude use of the authority granted
for a preliminary authorization merely because the proposed service or operation could be
found to be a needed and desirable one and the protection the Communications Act would
normally afford to the rights of other parties would delay an authorization made in the
usual manner.
Id.
82. Id.
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tend for section 309(f) to permit transfers of ongoing broadcast operations before full review under section 309(b), but that the Commission
itself did not intend to employ the special procedures of section 309(f)
solely because a tender offer for a broadcast company had been made.
d. The 1982 version of section 309(f). The Commission defends
its present application of section 309(f) to tender offers in part by referring to the 1982 amendment to that section.8 3 The amendment substitutes the word "temporary" for "emergency," extends the permissible
STA period from 90 to 180 days, and removes the limit on the number of
permissible extensions. Focusing on the insertion of "temporary" in lieu
of "emergency," the Commission contends that the amendment broadens
the section's reach. The Commission interprets the amendment as giving
it authority to grant STA's in non-critical situations.8 4 In the FCC's
view, to interpret the provision otherwise would assume that "Congress,
when amending the statute to delete the word 'emergency' in Section
309(f) made a virtually meaningless change."' 85 The intended effect of
the change, according to the FCC, is the removal of "a specific term of
limitation," replaced with a mere description of time. Because "temporary" has always been in the language of section 309(f), its substitution
for "emergency" results in no additional limitations.
One major flaw in the FCC's interpretation of the 1982 amendment
is that Congress made clear that the only substantive change to section
309(f) intended by the 1982 amendment was a modification of the duration of STA grants. In fact, the Commission, which itself proposed the
amendment, described it as part of a set of "technical... housekeeping
amendments."'8 6 The Commission's description is especially significant
in light of Congress' reliance on the FCC's representations. 87 In its description of the changes to the STA provision, the House report made no
mention of the substitution of "temporary" for "emergency." Instead,
the House focused exclusively on increasing the permissible STA period
to 180 days and removing the limit on the number of permissible extensions. 88 The House conference report also concentrated solely on the
83. Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087, 1094. For
text of section 309(f) as amended, see supra text accompanying note 25.
84. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1575.
85. Id. at 1575 n.174 (quoting L.P. Media, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1527, 1530 (1985)).
86. Letter from FCC Chairman Mark S. Fowler to U.S. Senate (Sept. 23, 1981).
87. See A Bill to Amend the CommunicationsAct of 1934 to Make Certain Technical Reyisions
Regarding the Administration ofSuch Act, andfor OtherPurposes: Hearingon H.R. 5008 Before the
,Subcomm. on Telecommunications, ConsumerProtection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981) (legislative proposals incorporated in the amendment contain "primarily technical and housekeeping revisions of existing law").
88. H. REP. No. 751, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982).
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modified STA time spans when describing the purposes behind the
amendment.8 9
Even if the FCC is correct that the change from "emergency" to
"temporary" in the amendment was meant to broaden the scope of the
section's applicability, tender offers would still fail to meet the provision's other requirements. The 1982 Amendment did not modify the section's limitation to "extraordinary circumstances" in which "operations"
are necessary to avoid prejudice to the public interest.
The Commission, however, claims that tender offers satisfied even
the original version of section 309(f). According to the FCC, even if the
1982 Amendment is purely technical and in no way expands the situations that qualify for STA's, the bifurcated procedure contained in the
Policy Statement is nonetheless authorized "[b]ecause Section 309(f) was
broad enough to encompass the grant of an STA in cases involving
tender offers prior to the 1982 amendments." 90 The Commission is correct in that both before and after the 1982 Amendments, a section 309(f)
STA was available to all applicants to which section 309(b)'s public comment period applied, including those seeking transfers of control. However, the fact that section 309(f) was available does not give validity to
the categorical application of it to all tender offers by the Policy Statement. Both before and after the 1982 Amendments, a tender offer in and
of itself does not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" as Congress
intended those words, and the mere transfer of control from a licensee to
a trustee does not constitute "operations" that might be necessary to
avoid prejudice to the public interest.
In view of the congressional focus solely on changes in the duration
of the STA, the Commission's own representations to Congress, and the
retention of both the "extraordinary circumstances" and the "operations" requirements, it is clear that even after the 1982 Amendment the
Communications Act continues to require full section 309(b) review
before permitting a transfer of ongoing broadcast operations. To conclude otherwise, as did the Commission in the Policy Statement, is contrary to the unambiguous intent of Congress. In fact, the Commission's
conclusion effectively means that Congress, without so much as a recorded comment, authorized a return to the repealed post-grant protest
procedures-in which the public could voice its concerns about an application only after the Commission has approved it.
Some corroboration of this interpretation may be gleaned from the
comments of Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the House En89. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1982).
90. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1576; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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ergy and Commerce Committee, before the National Association of

Broadcasters. He emphasized that section 309(f) "was not intended to
be applied to mergers; it was designed to allow temporary broadcast operations in emergency situations such as the destruction of a broadcast
facility by a hurricane." 91

The language and legislative history of the Communications Act
unambiguously reveal that Congress did not intend a section 309(f) STA
to be granted solely by virtue of a tender offer. For twenty-five years
following the enactment of section 309(f) the FCC understood the clear
intent of Congress. 92 The Commission uniformly restricted section

309(f)'s application to circumstances complying with the terms of the
provision-providing for temporary operations to start up or prevent discontinuance of services deemed necessary to the public interest.
3.

Commission Acknowledgement.

The Commission's own pro-

ceedings involving tender offers, as well as its rules implementing section
309(f), demonstrate the Commission's acknowledgement that the re-

quirements of section 309(f) are not categorically satisfied by tender offer
applicants.

For over two decades following the enactment of section 309(f), the
Commission consistently recognized that the provision, through its express language and legislative history, applies only where temporary authority is necessary to commence broadcast operations in the public
interest or to prevent their interruption. 93 In the past, the Commission
91. Dingell on Responsibility, BROADCASTING, Oct. 14, 1985, at 44.
92. See Scalia, JudicialDeference to AdministrativeInterpretationof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
518. Scalia confers a tempered deference to statutory interpretations made by government agencies:
[Tihe existence of a 'long-standing, consistent agency interpretation' that dates to the original enactment of the statute may be relevant to the first step of Chevron-that is, it may be
part of the evidence showing that the statute is in fact not ambiguous but has a clearly
defined meaning.
Id.
93. See, eg., Entertainment Communications, Inc., 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1685 (1979) (STA
granted to operate from relocated antenna site to permit continuous principal city service to Houston by sole classical music station serving city); Man Corp., 62 F.C.C.2d 260 (1977) (STA granted to
avoid interruption of service of only local broadcast service in community); Washoe Empire, 58
F.C.C.2d 1372 (1976) (STA granted for construction of broadcast translator because equipment of
only local TV station destroyed by fire); Ohio Educ. Television Network Comm'n, 37 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1106 (1976) (STA granted to new applicant to maintain only educational TV service where
existing licensee abruptly announced it was ceasing operations); Catholic Comm. for Refugees, 34
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1555 (1975) (STA granted for initial radio service to Vietnamese refugees in
refugee center awaiting resettlement in U.S.); Telemundo, Inc., 39 F.C.C.2d 522 (1973) (temporary
authorization granted for new translator service to prevent loss of existing service); Green County
Broadcasting Co., 24 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 143 (1972) (STA granted to new applicant to prevent
loss of community's only aural broadcast service where existing licensee's license not renewed); NEO
Broadcasting Co., 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 812 (1972) (STA granted to maintain only aural facility
during negotiations for joint interim operations by competing applicants pending determination of
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thus refused to find the existence of "extraordinary circumstances" absent a showing that specific programming would not be available to the
94
public without the grant of an STA.

As support for its position that tender offers meet the requirements

of section 309(f), the Policy Statement cites the only pre-1985 FCC proceeding in which section 309(f) was invoked in a transfer of control context,95 Gale Broadcasting Co. 96 This case, however, does not provide
precedent for the Commission's theory that the requirements of section
309(f) are met merely by an application to transfer control of a company

holding a broadcast license. In Gale the requisite "extraordinary circumstances"-in the threat to continuation of operations and unavailability
of the particular programming-existed independently of the transfer of

control.
Gale involved an FCC approved assignment of control of a station
in accordance with section 309(b) procedures. The assignment was set
aside by the court of appeals as potentially contrary to the public interest.

On remand, the Commission determined that a question remained as to
possible undue concentrations of control over the communications industry, a factor bearing on whether a transfer is in the public interest. The

Commission, therefore, designated the issue for an evidentiary hearing.
Pending this public interest determination, however, control of the

broadcasting facility could not be returned to the former owner of the
licensed corporation because he had "become seriously disabled by a

chronic and debilitating disease."' 97 Without an STA authorizing the assignee to broadcast, the station, which supplied the only "'fine arts' propermanent licensee); Pacifica Found., 27 F.C.C.2d 64 (1971) (STA granted for FM station to operate
from new site when previous site rendered unavailable by bombings); Nationwide Communications,
Inc., 19 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 844 (1970) (STA granted to new translator applicants where no
television station was available without translators and license of existing translator operator revoked); Voice of Reason, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 431 (1969) (STA granted to new applicant to return local
AM outlet to the air after former licensee surrendered license); Regents of the U. of Idaho, 10
F.C.C.2d 690 (1967) (STA granted for VHF translator to provide new educational programming;
delay would cause weather to prevent construction); Jellico Dev. Ass'n, 2 F.C.C.2d 221 (1965) (STA
granted to restore the only local translator service which had terminated when former licensee failed
to renew); Birmingham Broadcasting Corp., 3 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 252 (1964) (STA granted to
new applicant to maintain the only local service where former permittee was denied license); Community Radio, Inc., 2 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 290 (1964) (STA granted to restore the only local service
which had terminated when former licensee surrendered license); Seward Broadcasting Corp., 3
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 314 (1964) (STA granted when community's only station was destroyed by
earthquake making immediate action imperative).
94. See, e.g., Indianapolis Broadcasting, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 48, 49 (1976) (STA denied, even
though operations were to be interrupted, since party did not provide "any specific programming or
service not otherwise available").
95. See Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1573-74.
96. 15 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 337 (1969), reconsiderationdenied, 19 F.C.C.2d 623 (1969).
97. Id. at 342.
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gramming" in the area, 98 would not have been able to continue
operations. 99 Although Gale demonstrates that section 309(f) may validly be employed in the context of a transfer of control, it lends no authority for the Commission's decision that all tender offers involving
FCC licenses satisfy the requirements of section 309(f).
The Commission also relied on Telesis Corp. 100 to justify its decision
that applications for transfers of control meet the requirements for STA
grants. The Commission's analogy to the special temporary authorization granted in the transfer context in that proceeding pursuant to section 309(c)(2)(G) for nonbroadcast operations, however, provides equally
unconvincing support. 10 1 The denial of temporary authorization in Telesis would have left the stations "unmanaged" and "in limbo."' 1 2 Addi-

tionally, section 309(c)(2)(G) is of questionable relevance because, unlike
section 309(f), it requires no showing either of extraordinary circumstances or that delay in the institution of operations would prejudice the
public interest.
Only after the Commission tentatively decided to bypass the pregrant protest procedure of section 309(b) in tender offer situations pursuant to its Notice of Inquiry 103 -the precursor to the Policy Statement-

are there FCC proceedings utilizing section 309(f) STA grants in such
situations. In both One Two Corp. 104 and L.P. Media, Inc. 105 the Commission employed the two-step procedure of granting a trustee special
temporary authority, followed by long form review of the tender offeror's
application. These two proceedings, however, can hardly be considered
justification or precedent for a decision that the Commission reached
10 6
before it considered them.

98. Id. at 338.
99. Upon reconsideration of the grant, the Commission again upheld that granting the STA
was "the only course to permit continued service to the public during an expedited hearing." Gale,
19 F.C.C.2d at 624.
100. 68 F.C.C.2d 696 (1978).
101. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1574. Section 309(c)(2)(G) in its entirety provides that
section 309(b) does not apply to "a special temporary authorization for nonbroadcast operation not
to exceed thirty days where no application for regular operation is contemplated to be filed or pending the filing of an application for such regular operation." 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)(2)(G) (1988).
102. Telesis, 68 F.C.C.2d at 700.
103. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 10, at 18 (adopted July 9, 1985; released August 20,
1985).
104. 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924 (adopted July 12, 1985; released July 17, 1985).
105. 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1527 (adopted August 26, 1985; released August 27, 1985).
106. It is interesting to note that in One Two Corp. the hostile tender offer was not itself the
extraordinary circumstance requiring temporary authorization. The Commission emphasized the
upcoming shareholders' meeting where management would propose its reorganization plan. This
meeting was relied upon as the extraordinary circumstance since "a delay in [Commission] determination of this case beyond the August shareholders' meeting would deny [the target company] share-
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Nor can the Commission's own rules implementing section 309(f)
be relied on to justify granting interim trusteeships for tender offers involving communication companies. 10 7 To the contrary, the adoption of
those regulations reinforces Congress' unambiguous intent to strictly
limit section 309(f)'s applicability. Section 73.1635 of the rules promulgated by the Commission defines a special temporary authorization as
"authority granted to a permittee or licensee to permit the operation of a
broadcast facility for a limited period at a specific variance from the
terms of the station authorization [for example broadcasting from a different location] ....,"108 The FCC thus initially recognized that section
309(f) is concerned with allowing broadcast operations to continue-not
with the identity of the operators.
Section 73.3542 of the rules, 10 9 also implementing section 309(f),
demonstrates even more clearly that the Commission understood that
tender offers alone do not satisfy the provision's requirements. Despite
the 1982 amendment to section 309(f) substituting the term "temporary"
for "emergency," this Commission rule limits temporary authority to
"extraordinary circumstances requiring emergency operation to serve the
public interest.""10 The examples of qualifying emergencies provided by
the Commission all involve crisis situations such as threats to life, property, and national security."' Although this regulation was meant to be
merely indicative of situations that qualify for section 309(f) grants as
opposed to an exhaustive list,11 2 it is clear that tender offers manifestly
lack the requisite volatility.
The procedure endorsed by the Commission in the Policy Statement
violates the mandates of the Communications Act. The language of section 309(f), its legislative history, and the Commission's own administration of the provision all reveal that Congress clearly and unambiguously
did not intend the section's criteria to be satisfied merely by virtue of a
tender offer.
holders the opportunity to consider the [tender offeror's] proposal at the same time as management's
proposal." 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 929.
107. Realizing that its regulations were not supportive of the new procedure, the Commission
expressly disclaimed reliance on them. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1576 ("[W]e do not base
our authority to utilize an STA upon any of our regulations; rather, it is predicated directly and
exclusively upon Section 309 (f) of the Communications Act.").
108. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1635(a) (1989).
109. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3542 (1989).
110. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3542(a) (emphasis added).
111. The example situations listed are "emergencies involving danger to life and property; a
national emergency proclaimed by the President or the Congress of the U.S.A. and; the continuance
of any war in which the United States is engaged, and where such action is necessary for the national
defense or security or otherwise in furtherance of the war effort." Id.
112. The rule states that emergency situations "include" the enumerated crises. Id.
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III.

A.

POLICY

The Statute's Public Interest Goal

Not only is the Commission's procedure unlawful, but the policies
underlying it contravene the Communications Act's charge to the FCC.
The basic mandate of the FCC is to act in the public interest.11 3 The
Commission's desire to further the free marketplace for transfer of control of companies holding broadcast licenses conflicts with its responsibility to ensure that transfers of control are in the public interest.
While complying with the procedural mandates of the Communications Act, the Commission must grant or deny applications for broadcast
licenses, for renewals or modifications of those licenses, and for transfers
of control involving companies holding such licenses, as the public interest, convenience and necessity dictate. Acting in the public interest is
"[n]ot a standard that lends itself to application with exactitude."' 14 The
absence of a clear definition of the "public interest" does not, however,
confer unlimited power on the FCC. The Supreme Court has "consistently held that the use of the words 'public interest' in a regulatory statute is not a broad license to promote the general public welfare. Rather,
the words take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation."11 5 The fundamental purpose of the Communications Act is to allocate and regulate the use of the airwaves." 6 In light of this purpose,
the public interest that the Commission is to further is the societal interest in receiving high-quality broadcast services from qualified
7
licensees. "1
The policy behind the FCC licensing procedures is protection of the
public interest in broadcast services-not the protection of private economic interests. In the context of transfers of control involving broadcast licenses, therefore, the issues that the Commission has traditionally
addressed when making its public interest determinations include the fi113. Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
114. FCC v RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953).
115. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976).
116. FCC v. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940).
117. See One Two Corp., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924, 941 (1985) (Quello, Comm'r, dissenting);
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943); SandersBros., 309 U.S. at 475
("An important element of public interest and convenience affecting the issue of a license is the
ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service to the community reached by his broadcasts."). For a catalogue of the matters that the FCC routinely inquires into when making public
interest determinations, see 3 Rad. Reg. Digest (P & F) q 53.24. These matters include: the financial
qualifications of the applicant, the applicant's character qualifications, violations of the Communications Act or FCC rules by the applicant, the degree of integration of ownership and management,
the applicant's participation in civic activities, diversification of control of communications media,
the applicant's sense of public service responsibility, its programming plans, and its efforts to ascertain community needs. Id.
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nancial qualifications of the transferee, '1 8 the character qualifications of
the transferee, 119 and the transferee's responsiveness to the needs of the
broadcast community.120 Although acting in the public interest will not

necessarily further marketplace competitiveness, 121 it is the Commission's directive.

B. The Policy Statement's Goals
The Commission determined that applying the traditional long form
procedures of section 309 to tender offers results in protracted delay, unduly favors management, and conflicts with the policies underlying the
Williams Act, all of which are said to disserve the public interest. 122 The
bifurcated procedure advocated in the Policy Statement was aimed at
curing these "infirmities." 1 23 The policy objectives that the new procedure was to accomplish were accordingly: (1) to avoid unnecessary delay;124 (2) to promote strict governmental neutrality in the tender offer
118. See, e.g., MMM Holdings, Inc., 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1593, 1597-1601 (1989) (applicant
must demonstrate the availability of necessary funds with reasonable assurance in order to acquire
cellular or television companies); The President and Directors of Georgetown College, 50 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 366 (1981) (Commission denied a reconsideration of transferring a license to applicant
upon determining that applicant was financially qualified to acquire and operate a noncommercial
educational radio station). See generally New Financial Qualifications Standard for Broadcast Assignment and Transfer Applicants, 49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1291, 1292 (1981) (applicants must
show sufficient capital to consummate the transaction and to meet expenses for three months).
119. The character of the applicant will be considered insofar as it involves violations of the
Communications Act or the Commission's rules, instances of fraud or misrepresentation in programming, adjudicated instances of fraud before a governmental agency, criminal convictions involving
fraud or dishonesty, and adjudicated instances of anticompetitive behavior. See Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 801 (1986). For recent examples of FCC
inquiries into such matters in the transfer of control context, see MMM Holdings, 66 Rad. Reg. at
1605 (potential antitrust violations); Gannett Co., 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1054, 1055 (1986) (potential violations of multiple ownership rules); Acadian Television Corp., 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
743, 745 (1982) (same).
120. See, eg., Metromedia Radio & Television, Inc., 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1196, 1202 (1985)
(Commission assigned broadcast license to applicant dismissing the allegation that such a grant
would not be in the public interest because of the possible increase in violent entertainment programming and a reduction in the amount of children's programming); Grinnell Communications Corp.,
49 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1520, 1523 (1981) (responsiveness to needs and interests of minorities in
viewing area).
121. See Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("[C]ompetitive
effects may under some sets of circumstances produce detriment to the public interest. When that
happens the public interest controls."); Yankee Network v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(although Commission may appropriately be concerned with preserving competition in broadcasting, "it certainly does not follow therefrom that Congress intended the Commission to grant or deny
an application in any case, other than in the interest of the public").
122. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1562.
123. Id. at 1557.
124. Id. at 1539.

Vol. 1991:240]

BROADCAST TENDER OFFERS

context; 125 and (3) to accommodate other state and federal laws and policies concerning corporation governance.1 26 Although long form review
has its faults, the Commission's characterization of its "infirmities" is
misleading. In addition, the objectives sought may actually contravene
the public interest.
1. Avoiding Delays. As indicated earlier, the long-form procedures of section 309 call for a thirty-day waiting period for public comment following public notice by the Commission of the filing of a license
application.127 If petitions to deny the application are ified, then the applicant is allowed ten additional days to file an opposition. 128 Reply to
that opposition must be made within five days after the time for filing
oppositions has expired. 129 An additional three days will be added to the
opposition and reply filing periods if service is by mail.130 As the Commission summarized, this procedure leads to a "potential 51-day period
before the pleading cycle ends. Intervention of weekends and holidays
could extent [sic] the period even further .... If an evidentiary hearing
were required [as would be the case if substantial questions of fact exist13 1], the delay would be significantly longer."' 132 The Commission concluded that these "unnecessary" delays disserve the public interest in the
33
context of a tender offer.'
The Commission, however, has the authority to reduce the deadlines
for submission of responsive pleadings, as these time limits are not statutorily imposed. Recognition of the importance of public input on the
licensing decision has lead the Commission to conclude that expedition
of the protest and response procedures would be "unwise .... [It] would
134
impede the ability of interested parties to make their views known."'
The Commission itself then implicitly accepts that delay in granting an
application is a necessary element of protecting the public interest-not
135
an unnecessary element to be avoided.
125. Id. at 1540.
126. Id.
127. 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1988); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
128. 47 C.F.R. § 1.45(a) (1990).
129. 47 C.F.R. § 1.45(b) (1990).
130. 47 C.F.R. § 1.4(h) (1990).
131. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1988).
132. One Two Corp., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at 929 n.6.
133. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1539-40.
134. Id. at 1562.
135. The decision not to abbreviate public comment periods due to the vital role of such input in
licensing decisions is particularly significant in light of the tendency of the bifurcated procedure
toward prejudgment. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. Because of the possibility of
Commission bias, public input at step two of the review may be meaningless.
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The FCC supplied two examples to support its position that procedural delays harm the public interest, and thus that by avoiding these
delays the Commission complies with its statutory duty of furthering the
public interest. First, according to the Policy Statement these "unwarranted delay[s] unnecessarily burden the resources of private parties and
the Commission." 1 36 This allegation, although most likely true, does
nothing to support the FCC's position that this new procedure will further the public interest. In fact, the Commission's bifurcated procedure
may unnecessarily burden the resources of private parties and the Commission to an even greater extent than the traditional long form review.
Determining the trustee's qualifications and assessing the degree of the
trustee's insulation from the offeror in step one of the procedure entails
considerable burdens for proponents, opponents, and the Commission.
Further, even under the new procedure the standard periods for public
comment and petitions to deny will apply in step two when the tender
offeror's license application is considered. Thus, the overall administrative burden on the Commission will likely be greater under the bifurcated
procedure. The entire first step is an unnecessary expenditure of time
and money in the event that a transfer of control to the tender offeror is
not ultimately approved.
The Policy Statement's second justification for its position is that
such delays can "deprive shareholders of an effective choice in determining whether to tender their stock .... ,"137 Apparently, the FCC is referring to the possibility that incumbent management may take action
during the FCC proceedings which effectively denies shareholders the
option of tendering their stock. One Two Corp. involved a problem of
that sort. The incumbent management was scheduled to present its own
reorganization plan for the company at an upcoming shareholder meeting. 138 Due to the time constraints of long-form review, an FCC decision
on the tender offeror's application would not be made prior to that meeting. The Commission feared that shareholders who accepted management's offer might do so only because the option to sell their stock to the
tender offeror was not presented simultaneously. The Commission thus
concluded that administrative delay might effectively deny shareholders
1 39
the opportunity to consider the tender offeror's proposal.
136. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1539.
137. Id.
138. One Two Corp., 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 924, 925 (1985).
139. "A delay in our determination of this case beyond the August shareholders' meeting would
deny Multimedia's shareholders the opportunity to consider the Cooke proposal at the same time as
management's proposal. Those shareholders who accept management's offer might never be able to
consider Cooke's proposal." Id. at 929.
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There are two flaws in relying on this scenario as a basis for the
theory that an alternative to long form procedures is necessary to further
the public interest. First, the traditional procedure does not bar a tender
offeror from informing stockholders of his intentions before the FCC approves his application. As the Commission phrased it, "[w]hile a person
seeking control of a communications entity can initiate a tender offer for
a licensee without our prior consent,... [the Communications Act prohibits his acquiring] control through the purchase of the tendered stock
until after the Commission grants approval of a license transfer application."1 40 If the tender offeror chooses, he may apprise the stockholders
of his plans and try to convince them of his proposal's merits. Even
though his ultimate purchase of the stock may be delayed, if the stockholders favor his proposal they will not make corporate decisions that
will bar its fruition.
More important than the fact that the traditional long-form procedures do not necessarily deprive shareholders of a choice, the Commission errs by focusing on the shareholders of the licensee to determine
what is in the public interest. The Commission is too willing to equate
private economic interests with the "public interest." The FCC's desire
to serve private shareholder interests should not be allowed to override
its express statutory duty. The delays inherent in the Commission's administrative processes impose conditions on shareholders of communications entities that would otherwise not exist in the marketplace.14 1 The
effects of these conditions should be of no concern to the FCC. As
shown by the express terms of the Communications Act, Congress determined that the interests of private shareholders and their power to sell
control of a broadcast company must be subordinated to and, if necessary, delayed by FCC examination of the larger public interest.
2. PromotingNeutrality. The second policy goal the Commission
sought to achieve through the trusteeship procedure was the promotion
of governmental neutrality in the context of tender offers. It is not in the
public interest for an administrative process to be utilized as a shield by
management or as a sword by the tender offeror. According to the FCC,
delays inherent in the long form procedures "unduly favor the incumbent
management of a licensee at the expense of a challenger in several
respects." 14 2
140. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1557-58.
141. Id. at 1561 ("[Tlhese delays effectively deprive shareholders of communications entities of
options that would otherwise exist in the marketplace ... .
142. Id. at 1558.
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First, the Commission argues that traditional procedures make acceptance of tender offers unattractive to shareholders. Shareholders allegedly are faced with an indeterminate, but prolonged period during
which their assets will be tied up if they accept the offer. In addition, the
shareholders have no guarantee that the tender offeror will ultimately
meet Commission approval and be able to purchase their stock. This
portrayal of the unattractiveness of tendering shares is misleading.
Although the tender offeror cannot purchase the shares before the Commission completes its review, the shareholder's assets are not tied up indefinitely. Nothing about Commission review bars the exercise of
otherwise available rights under the Williams Act to withdraw tendered
shares.143 Finally, that the shareholders of broadcast companies cannot
be certain that a tender offeror will ultimately purchase their stock does
not make tender offers unusually unattractive. Shareholders of any type
of stock cannot be certain that the tender offeror will purchase all of their
stock. 144 Certainly the public interest does not demand affording communications industry shareholders greater protections than those afforded to all others.
The Policy Statement's second illustration of how the use of longform procedures unduly favors incumbent management is that procedural delays may impede the tender offeror's effort. The offeror may not
be able to consummate the transaction prior to the time when the shareholders are permitted to withdraw their shares. 4 5 As previously mentioned, 14 6 the Williams Act gives tendering shareholders a statutory right
of withdrawal sixty days after the commencement of the tender offer. 147
If Commission review exceeds the sixty-day deadline, then the shareholders, having determined that it is not in their best interest to sell their
stocks, may decide to take advantage of their withdrawal rights. It is not
the role of the Commission, however, to protect the tender offer of a
challenger whose public interest qualifications have not even been
examined.
As a final illustration of the claimed lack of neutrality in the use of
long form procedures, the Commission refers to various efforts that in143. The Williams Act provides for two periods during which tendered shares can be withdrawn: during the first seven days of the tender offer and anytime after sixty days from the offer's
commencement. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988).
144. In fact there are laws which anticipate over-acceptance by shareholders and focus on allocating between the tendering shareholders the number of stocks which are to be purchased. See 15

U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988).
145. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1559.
146. See supra note 38.
147. In the Policy Statement, the Commission identifies the day of filing of a transfer application
as the trigger for this sixty day period. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1559 n. 108.
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cumbent management can take to impede takeover bids while the tender
offeror's application is being reviewed. 14 8 The target company can
(1) repurchase its own securities; (2) announce dividend increases or
stock splits; (3) issue additional shares of stock; (4) acquire other
companies to produce an antitrust violation should the tender offer
succeed; (5) arrange a defensive merger; (6) enter into restrictive loan
agreements; [and] (7) institute litigation challenging the tender
offer. 149
Although these options may be available to the target company's management-thereby giving it an advantage over the challenger-the Commission's presentation distorts the situation. The implementation of
these devices is not limited to the communications industry. In fact, the
list was supplied by the SEC to demonstrate the various techniques employed by target companies generally to impede takeover attempts.150
Although the Commission presented a generally slanted picture of
how the use of long form procedures unduly favors incumbent management, many of its contentions have merit. The tendency of such procedures to favor incumbent management, however, does not validate the
Commission's goal of seeking to employ a procedure that favors neither
management nor challengers. There is no neutrality clause in the Communications Act. In fact, the Act reflects a congressional intent to impose different burdens or standards on certain parties. 5 1 No provision in
the Act addresses the balance to be struck between management and
challenger in a tender offer situation.
As a result, the validity of the Commission's neutrality goal depends
on whether the limited favoring of management occasioned by the long
form procedures serves the public interest. At the time a tender offer is
made to the shareholders of a broadcast licensee, the Commission has
already determined that incumbent management provides services that
benefit the public interest. No such assessment of the tender offeror has
been completed. The Commission would not be protecting the public
interest if it accorded the challenger's unassessed and uncertain impact
on the public interest the same weight as incumbent management's established benefit to the public interest.
The bifurcated procedure the Commission has endorsed contravenes
the FCC's ability to provide a fair assessment of the tender offeror's qualifications. When the Commission authorizes an expedited transfer of ten148. Id. at 1560.
149. Id. at 1560 n.111 (quoting Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 638 n.13 (1982)).
150. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 638 n.13.
151. For example, if more than one applicant for a single license meets the requirements of
section 308, section 309(i) instructs the Commission to place "significant preferences" on applicants
controlled by minorities. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A) (1988).
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dered stocks to a trustee, great potential exists for prejudgment and bias
in favor of granting ultimate approval to the tender offeror. Once the
target company has been placed in a trusteeship, the effect of Commission disapproval of the transfer application on the target, shareholders,
and tender offeror himself could exert tremendous pressure on the Commission to approve the transfer of control. In fact, in none of the STA
cases in which the trustee was able to consummate the tender offer has
the FCC thereafter rejected the long form application of the tender
offeror.
If the ultimate transfer is not approved by the FCC, a lengthy period
may follow "during which control and the company's business plans may
be uncertain... impair[ing] the ability of the company to obtain financing, making it more difficult to operate the company."15 2 These possible
operational problems, which would affect not only the target company
but also the remaining shareholders, may sway the Commission into approving a transfer that disserves the public interest when it assesses the
merits of a transfer of control from the trustee to the tender offeror. In
addition, disapproval by the Commission will require the trustee to dispose of the previously collected stock. Disapproval "may result in distress sale pricing, further exacerbating the problems of the target
company" and remaining shareholders.1 53 Finally, the Commission may
feel pressure to approve the final transfer in order to avoid financial harm
to the tender offeror, who bears the financial risk of any loss incurred
when the trustee sells the tendered stock.
The D.C. Circuit has acknowledged the potential for prejudice at
the final decisional stage created by interim grants of authority. In Community BroadcastingCo. v. F C.C., the court vacated the FCC's grant of
interim operating authority to one of two applicants competing for a license because "the grant of temporary authority ... is pregnant with
danger" of impairing the Commission's later decisionmaking.154 Significant financial investment would have been at stake at the subsequent decisional stage, and the court found that "[o]rdinary human experience
tells us that these factors have a force which cannot always be set aside
by the triers no matter how sincere their effort or intent."' 55 The risk
that the Commission will be prejudiced when assessing the tender offeror
152. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1591 (quoting Notice of Inquiry Comments submitted
by CBS).
153. Stock prices may drop drastically due to the fire sale nature of the disposition. Id. at 1591
(citing Notice of Inquiry Comments submitted by CBS).
154. 274 F.2d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
155. Id. at 759. Later, in Consolidated Nine, Inc. v. FCC, the Court, in summarizing Community's holding, concluded that "[t]he tendency of this circumstance [prior expenditures] would be to
prejudice the other applicant notwithstanding the Commission's good faith in trying to disregard the
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in the transfer proceeding demonstrates that the trusteeship procedure
not only potentially lacks neutrality, but also may disserve the public
interest.
3. Accommodating Other Laws and Policies. The third policy objective the Commission intended to satisfy by adopting its new procedure
for tender offer approval was to accommodate to the fullest extent possible state and federal laws and policies concerning corporations. More
specifically, the Commission focused on the policies embodied in the Williams Act.156 One purpose of the Williams Act is to ensure that investors
would have the ability to make informed decisions in response to tender
offers.t 5 7 The Act includes filing and disclosure requirements,15 8 highest
price guarantees,15 9 and antifraud provisions. 160 As an additional protection afforded stockholders, the Act provides for two periods during
which tendered shares can be withdrawn: during the first seven days of
the tender offer 16 ' and any time after sixty days from the offer's
commencement. 162
In its attempt to accommodate the policies behind the Williams Act,
the Commission focuses on the latter time frame. The "60-day maximum,"1 63 as the Commission refers to it, represents a determination by
Congress that an offeror who has not closed the transaction by that time
should not be permitted to continue to lock up tendered stock. From
this determination the Commission infers "a Congressional expectation
that a tender offer would be conducted within this 60-day time period
under ordinary circumstances." 1 4 To accommodate this "expectation,"
potential economic loss if the temporary operator were denied the final grant .... 403 F.2d 585,
589 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
156. The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988)).
157. The Act "is designed solely to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors."
113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (Statement of Sen. Williams). Achieving governmental neutrality was
not the object of the Act, but is a necessary characteristic of legislation with the purpose of protecting shareholder interests. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977). For discussion of
neutrality as an FCC policy objective, see supra notes 142-155 and accompanying text.
158. Upon commencement of a tender offer, the offeror is required to provide information regarding the offer to shareholders, the SEC, and the target company. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988).
159. Shareholders need not hold out for fear that they will be financially disadvantaged if they
tender their stock early. The offeror is required by statute to purchase all tender shares at the same
price. If the purchase price increases during the offer, stockholder's who already tendered shares
receive the benefit of that increase. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988). The SEC, through a regulation, has extended the initial period to 15 business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)-(1) (1989).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988).
163. Policy Statement, supra note 11, at 1556.
164. Id.
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the Commission's bifurcated procedure is designed to permit consummation of the tender offers within sixty days.
The FCC has no legal mandate to enforce any statute other than the
Communications Act. Accordingly, the Commission cannot abrogate its
statutory duties in the name of comity. The Commission may, however,
consider all relevant factors in determining what best serves the public
interest, including the federal policy underlying the Williams Act. 165
Whether the policies of the Williams Act should ultimately be relied on
by the Commission in altering its tender offer procedures depends largely
upon the similarity between the duties and roles of the SEC and the FCC
and the similarity between the goals sought by the Williams Act and the
166
Communications Act.
The SEC's mandate is the consideration of shareholder and investor
interests, whereas the FCC is concerned with the listening and viewing
public. Interests of shareholders and investors and interests of the public
at large may conflict. The objective of the SEC under the Williams Act is
to implement the policy of full disclosure, enabling shareholders and investors to make informed decisions.1 67 Unlike the FCC, the SEC is not
concerned with the substantive impact of the transaction on the operations of the target company or on the welfare of non-investors.1 68 With
such entirely different duties and objectives, the FCC and the SEC understandably have different types and lengths of regulatory review. If the
FCC is to protect the public interest in high-quality broadcast service
from a qualified broadcaster, it is inappropriate for the Commission to
gauge its tender offer procedures by the standards of the SEC.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Commission abrogated its statutory mandate in adopting the
Policy Statement's bifurcated procedure for tender offer applications.
165. See"La Rose v. F.C.C., 494 F.2d 1145, 1147 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Administrative agencies
have been required to consider other federal policies not unique to their particular area of administrative expertise, when fulfilling their mandate to assure that their regulatees operate in the public
interest."); Storer Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 763 F.2d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Commission
must implement Communications Act as consistently as possible with the objectives of securities
laws).
166. Cf McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 83-85 (1944). Though they both
applied to the same entity, the railroad legislation was enacted to further different goals in a different
manner than the anti-trust laws; the railroad legislation achieved the public interest of an "adequate,
efficient, and economical system of transportation through close supervision of business operations
and practices rather than through heavy reliance on the enforcement of free competition," id. at 83,
so the ICC was instructed not to measure proposals by the standards of antitrust laws.
167. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 32 (1977); Schreiber v. Burlington N.,
Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
168. See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 11.
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The language of section 309(f), its legislative history, and the Commission's own administration of the provision reveal that tender offers do not
categorically satisfy the criteria of section 309(f). The illegal procedure
cannot be staunchly defended even on policy grounds. The policy objectives that the Commission sought to achieve by employing a section
309(f) STA in the context of tender offer applications are arguably invalid themselves. In its effort to expose the broadcast industry to aspects of
the free market for corporate control, the Commission neglected its congressionally prescribed mission to serve the public interest-not shareholder and market place interests. In order for the bifurcated procedure
adopted in the Policy Statement to be legally applied categorically to all
tender offers, congressional action is necessary. Congress will need to
amend the Communications Act's license approval procedures and perhaps even the Commission's public interest mandate.
Jennifer L. Gimer

